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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
KENT KARL KIRKWOOD : Case No. 20010321-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated section 76-10-503(2)(a) (1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) which grants this Court authority to review 
appeals in criminal cases not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) trial judges may admit evidence of another 
crime after scrupulously examining the facts surrounding the prior offense and if the prior 
act is admitted for a non-character purpose, is relevant to proving a material disputed fact, 
and its prejudicial impact does not substantially outweigh its probative value. The trial 
judge ruled that if the Appellant testified, the judge would admit evidence of an unrelated 
robbery to prove intent, but, in doing so he failed to consider the circumstances of that 
crime, when that crime occurred, or the effect admitting the robbery would have on the 
defense case. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in admitting this evidence? 
This Court reviews the admission of prior bad acts for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57,1J18, 993 P.2d 837. Trial counsel opposed the admission 
of the robbery conviction at R. 188: 49-55, 70-73. 
STATUTES AND COURT RULES 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-503(2)(b) (1999) bars persons serving 
probation from possessing a "dangerous weapon."1 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-50 l(4)(a) (1999)2 defines a dangerous weapon 
as follows: 
(a) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of 
its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury. The following factors shall be used in 
determining whether a knife, or any other item, object, or thing 
not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous 
weapon: 
]The legislature amended subsection 76-10-503(2)(b) in 2000 but did not change the 
substance of that provision. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 2001). 
2The legislature also amended section 76-10-501 in 2000 and moved subsection 4(a) to 
subsection 5(a). Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (Supp. 2001). This change did not affect 
the substance of that provision. 
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(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing 
was used; and 
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, 
object, or thing may be used. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 402, all relevant evidence is admissible: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
According to Utah Rule of Evidence 403, even relevant evidence is not admissible 
if its potential for prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Courts must also exclude evidence of prior bad acts under Utah Rule of Evidence 
404(b) if that evidence merely shows bad character: 
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets 
the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 31, 2000, the State filed an Information charging Appellant Kent Karl 
Kirkwood with two counts of possession of a weapon by a restricted person. R. 4-5. 
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound over Mr. Kirkwood on both 
charges. R. 186: 25.3 The trial court tried Mr. Kirkwood before a jury on January 24, 
2001. R. 188. The jury acquitted Mr. Kirkwood on the first count but convicted him on 
the second. R. 188: 99. On March 12, 2001, the trial court sentenced Mr. Kirkwood to a 
term of up to five years in prison. R. 189: 8; Addendum. Mr. Kirkwood filed a timely 
notice of appeal on March 19, 2001. R. 165. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In August of 2000, Mr. Kirkwood was serving probation for a second degree 
felony conviction for robbery. R. 188:28-29. The evidence presented at trial did not 
3Volume 186 contains the preliminary hearing transcript. Volume 188 contains the 
trial transcript and volume 189 contains the sentencing transcript. The internal page 
numbers of those volumes are listed after "R." and the volume number. 
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indicate the date of the conviction or the length of probation. As a standard condition of 
probation, Mr. Kirkwood agreed not to possess any weapons, including knives. R. 188: 
31-32. Probationers may, however, use knives for employment purposes and when 
eating. R. 188:40,46. 
On August 30, 2000, Mr. Kirkwood's probation officer, Roberta Hansen, and Ms. 
Hansen's co-worker Jeremy Poor visited Mr. Kirkwood's Salt Lake County home to 
conduct a search. R. 188: 29. Mr. Kirkwood lived with his mother in a small two-
bedroom home. R. 188: 30, 42-43. Ms. Kirkwood's mother greeted the probation 
officers in the yard and gave them permission to search the home. R. 188: 30. About the 
same time, Mr. Kirkwood emerged from a truck parked in the driveway and willingly 
submitted to a pat down search. R. 188: 30. The search revealed no contraband. R. 188: 
41-42,61. 
Mr. Kirkwood and his mother then escorted the officers inside the home to conduct 
the search. R. 188: 31. The group proceeded directly to Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom. R. 
188: 31. Mr. Kirkwood's room was only accessible by walking through his mother's 
bedroom or through a door that led directly outside to the back yard. R. 188: 42-43. The 
room was extremely cluttered with bags, clothing, and tools on the floor. R. 188: 31, 35-
36. It was also used as a laundry room. R. 188: 35, 42. 
Officer Hansen checked the bed for weapons and then sat Mr. Kirkwood on the 
bed. R. 188:31. She then glanced toward the head of the bed and saw a knife sitting on a 
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table next to the bed. R. 188: 32. The knife had a curved-four inch blade with a handle 
made of wood or bone. R. 188: 32. Mr. Kirkwood acknowledged that he was not 
allowed to possess any knives but he stated that he had brought the knife into to his room 
the previous night to use to eat his dinner. R. 188: 33, 57. According to Officer Hansen, 
she saw no plates or food on the table and she found no food residue on the knife. R. 188: 
56-57. Mr. Kirkwood stated that he understood that if he brought a kitchen knife into his 
room, probation officials would consider the knife to be a weapon. R. 188: 34-35. 
After locating the knife, Officer Poor noticed a red gym bag on the floor. R. 188: 
64. Inside the bag was a folding knife with a three-inch, serrated blade. R. 188: 37. 
There was nothing else in the bag. R. 188: 66. The probation officers then arrested Mr. 
Kirkwood. R. 188:38. 
Mr. Kirkwood explained that the knife in the gym bag belonged to his friend. R. 
188: 67. Upon further questioning, he noted that he also had on his night stand a multi-
purpose tool that contained several blades and implements. R. 188: 38-39, 69. The 
probation officers also found a pocket knife in a tool box. R. 188: 69. The officers 
considered both of these devices to be tools and did not charge Mr. Kirkwood for 
possessing them. R. 188: 48. The probation officers, with the help of police officers who 
arrived later, searched the entire house, with the exception of the kitchen drawers and 
cupboards, and found no other weapons. R. 188: 39, 47. 
The State charged Mr. Kirkwood with two counts of possessing a weapon for the 
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curved knife found on the table next to the bed and the folding knife found in the gym 
bag. R. 4-5. The trial court conducted a jury trial in January of 2001. R. 188. The 
parties stipulated at the outset to instruct the jury that Mr. Kirkwood was a restricted 
person because he was on probation for second degree robbery. R. 188: 6-7. 
During opening statements, defense counsel informed the jury that they would 
"hear from Mr. Kirkwood" why he was using the curved knife found next to his bed. R. 
188: 25. Specifically, defense counsel stated that Mr. Kirkwood would testify that he 
used the knife as a tool to cut tape and to carve meat that he ate for dinner. R. 188: 25. 
He added that it was not easy for Mr. Kirkwood "to come in here and-and face you, but 
he's willing to do that and we just hope that you'll hear our side of the story." R. 188: 26. 
On cross-examination of Officer Hansen, defense counsel elicited that Mr. 
Kirkwood could possess most any object, including a knife, if used for its intended 
purpose. R. 188: 46. For example, a probationer could use a baseball bat if used for 
recreation but not to hit someone. R. 188: 46-47. Thus, Officer Hansen conceded that 
Mr. Kirkwood could use a knife to eat. R. 188: 47. 
On redirect, the prosecutor requested a hearing outside the jury's presence. R. 
188: 48. The prosecutor sought to elicit from Officer Hansen that Mr. Kirkwood had 
committed his robbery offense with the use of a knife. R. 188: 49, 54. The prosecutor 
argued that the defense had opened the door to the admission of that prior act when it 
distinguished between using a knife as a weapon and for allowed uses such as 
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employment purposes or when eating. R. 188:52-53. According to the prosecutor, the 
previous use of a knife to commit a robbery would show that Mr. Kirkwood intended to 
possess the knife as a weapon in this case. R. 188: 49, 53. 
Defense counsel argued that the defense could only open the door to the prior use 
of a knife for impeachment purposes if Mr. Kirkwood had first testified and then 
misrepresented the facts surrounding his robbery offense. R. 188: 49. In any event, 
defense counsel pointed out that the State actually raised the distinction between knives 
used as weapons and as tools when it decided not to charge Mr. Kirkwood for possessing 
the multi-purpose tool or the pocket knife found in the tool box. R. 188: 51. Defense 
counsel also objected that the admission of the prior bad act would prejudice the jury and 
serve to highlight the robbery conviction. R. 188: 50. According to defense counsel, the 
only relevant inquiry in this case was that Mr. Kirkwood was a restricted person not his 
prior use of a knife. R. 188: 50. 
The trial judge regarded the issue as Ma really close one." R. 188: 52. Upon 
learning that Officer Hansen only knew of the robbery conviction from a presentence 
report rather than from personal knowledge, the trial judge decided not to admit the facts 
of the robbery conviction. R. 188:54-55. 
After the presentation of the State's case following a lunch break, the trial judge 
sua sponte revisited his decision to exclude evidence that Mr. Kirkwood used a knife in 
the robbery. R. 188: 70. He reasoned that the prior use of a knife was relevant but "not 
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overwhelmingly relevant" to determining whether Mr. Kirkwood intended to possess a 
weapon in this case. R. 188: 71. As an example, the trial judge stated that if 100 
convicted felons had used a knife in a prior crime, the chances that they subsequently 
intended to possess a knife as a weapon would be "somewhat greater" compared to 
convicted felons who had not used a knife in a prior offense. R. 188: 71. 
The trial judge concluded further that the evidence of a prior use of a knife only 
"slight[ly] increase[d]" the prejudice to the defense because the jury knew that Mr. 
Kirkwood had been convicted of second degree robbery. R. 188: 71-72. Finally, the trial 
judge agreed that defense counsel's distinction between using a knife as a tool and as a 
weapon opened the door to the admission of the prior act and increased the relevance of 
that evidence. R. 188: 72. The trial judge, thus, ruled that he would admit the prior use 
of a knife if Mr. Kirkwood testified. R. 188:72. Following the trial judge's ruling, the 
defense rested without Mr. Kirkwood testifying. R. 188: 75. 
The jury acquitted Mr. Kirkwood of possessing the knife in the gym bag but 
convicted him for the knife found on the table next to the bed. R. 188: 36-37, 96-97, 99. 
The trial judge sentenced Mr. Kirkwood to a term of up to five years in prison and 
ordered the sentence to run consecutive to his sentence for the robbery conviction. R. 
158. This appeal followed. R. 165. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
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Before deciding whether to admit the prior use of a knife, Utah law required the 
trial judge to scrupulously examine the circumstances surrounding that act. But, the trial 
judge inquired into none of the details of the prior crime, including when the crime 
occurred, how the crime was committed, or the nature of Mr. Kirkwood's involvement. 
Instead, the judge only knew that Mr. Kirkwood had pleaded guilty to committing 
robbery with a knife. The failure to examine these facts was an abuse of discretion. 
Absent any details about the prior act, the trial judge also could not determine 
whether the State sought to admit the evidence for a non-character purpose. In fact, the 
State did not explain how the prior use of a knife showed intent in this matter. The 
evidence merely showed bad character. 
The prior act similarly lacked relevance. Even the trial judge admitted that the 
evidence had minimal probative value. Specifically, the prior use of a knife did not 
render Mr. Kirkwood's intent more or less probable in this case. The two offenses are not 
similar in nature and the limited known facts about the prior use of a knife are completely 
unrelated to the circumstances surrounding the weapon found in this case. Further, the 
trial judge's failure to determine whether the crimes occurred close in time precluded the 
admission of the prior act. 
Contrary to the State's claims, Mr. Kirkwood did not open the door to the 
admission of the prior act. The trial judge cited no reason why Mr. Kirkwood's act of 
testifying rendered the prior act more relevant than if Mr. Kirkwood had not testified. 
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The trial judge appears to have confused prior act evidence with impeachment evidence 
under Rule of Evidence 609. But, because Mr. Kirkwood did not testify or dispute the 
fact of his robbery conviction, the circumstances of that offense were not admissible as 
impeachment. Further, Mr. Kirkwood could not have opened the door to the prior act 
evidence because the State first raised the distinction between using a knife as a tool and 
as a weapon. Specifically, the prosecutor elicited at trial that the State did not charge Mr. 
Kirkwood for possessing the multi-purpose tool. 
Because the trial judge failed to scrupulously examine the prior act, he could not 
have adequately weighed the prejudicial effect and probative value of the evidence. He 
also failed to even consider the effect admitting the evidence would have on Mr. 
Kirkwood's decision to testify. Because only Mr. Kirkwood could reveal the facts 
surrounding his use of the knife, his uncompromised testimony was essential to rebutting 
the State's case. Further, given society's concern for violence, injecting the use of a 
dangerous weapon into evidence raised serious concerns for prejudice. 
The decision to admit the prior use of a knife had a devastating effect on the 
defense. Once the trial judge decided to admit the evidence, Mr. Kirkwood faced a no-
win situation. He could either testify and inform the jury of his past violence or he could 
decline to testify and let the jury speculate about why he had a knife in his room. The 
trial judge's mid-trial decision was particularly harmful to Mr. Kirkwood because defense 
counsel promised the jury that Mr. Kirkwood would testify and explain his actions. Mr. 
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Kirkwood's claims that he used the knife to eat and as a tool to cut tape was consistent 
with the multi-purpose use of his bedroom and would have given the jury the information 
it needed to acquit him. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING PRIOR ACT EVIDENCE WITHOUT 
CONSIDERING THE FACTS OF THE PRIOR CRIME 
OR ASSESSING THE EFFECT THE DECISION WOULD 
HAVE ON DEFENDANT'S DECISION TO TESTIFY 
The evidence that Mr. Kirkwood used a knife to commit robbery failed to meet the 
requirements for the admission of prior act testimony. The trial judge abused his 
discretion in failing to even consider the circumstances surrounding the prior act. 
Moreover, the State failed to show how the prior use of a knife proved that Mr. Kirkwood 
intended to possess the knife as a weapon in this matter or to show how he opened the 
door to the admission of the prior act. The prior conviction did not establish a non-
character fact and it was not relevant to proving intent in this matter. The trial judge 
further failed to appreciate the prejudicial effect the prior use of a knife would have had 
on the defense case and on Mr. Kirkwood's decision whether to testify at trial. Because 
only Mr. Kirkwood could establish how he used the knife found next to his bed, his 
failure to testify directly affected the jury's verdict. 
12 
A. The Trial Judge Abused His Discretion in 
Failing to Scrupulously Examine the Facts 
Surrounding the Robbery Conviction 
In deciding to admit evidence that Mr. Kirkwood previously used a knife, the trial 
judge failed to even consider the circumstances surrounding the robbery conviction. "It is 
fundamental to [Utah] law that a person may be convicted criminally only for his acts, not 
for his general character . . . or propensity to commit bad acts." State v. Saunders, 1999 
UT 59, f 15, 992 P.2d 951. Because "prior crimes may have such a powerful tendency to 
mislead the finder of fact," such evidence has limited admissibility. Id. Under Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), the trial court may only admit evidence of prior bad acts for 
"noncharacter purpose[s]" such as motive, intent, identity, common plan, or absence of 
mistake. State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, ^[21, 993 P.2d 837, cert, denied 528 U.S. 1164 
(2000). 
Given the tremendous potential for prejudicing the jury, "admission of prior crimes 
evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges." Id. at [^18. The 
scrupulous examination requirement is a trade-off under Utah law for conceding to trial 
judges discretion to admit prior bad act testimony even though that evidence has a potent 
tendency to bias jurors. Id. at ]f 16-18 (overruling limited deference standard announced 
in State v. Doporto. 935 P.2d 484 (1997)). The "failure of a trial court to undertake a 
scrupulous examination in connection with the admission of prior bad act evidence 
constitutes an abuse of discretion." State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ^[11, Utah 
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Adv. Rep. ; see also State v. Widdison. 2001 UT 60, f t t , 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 
(requiring scrupulous examination); State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^[23, 6 P.3d 
1120 (same). 
The trial judge failed to conduct such an examination. Before deciding to admit 
the robbery conviction, the trial judge only knew that Mr. Kirkwood committed the crime 
with a knife. He failed to consider where the robbery occurred, what, if anything, was 
taken, how long ago the crime took place, how the knife was used, or even what type of 
knife was used. Other relevant considerations include whether Mr. Kirkwood committed 
the offense on impulse or "was occasioned by addiction or uncontrollable habit." People 
v. Sandoval 314N.E.2d413, 418 (N.Y. 1974). 
This case is remarkably similar to Webster, in which the trial judge failed to 
examine the facts of a prior conviction before admitting it. There, the State arrested a car 
salesperson for taking a car from his employer without permission. 2001 UT App 283, 
1fl[3-4. The trial judge admitted the defendant's statement to police that he had been 
arrested in Virginia for "driving a vehicle off of a dealership lot." IcL at [^5. This Court 
ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the statement without inquiring 
into when the offense occurred, whether the defendant was employed by the dealership, 
or any other details surrounding the incident. Id. at p 7. According to this Court, "the 
trial court's ruling on this issue without adequate information regarding the prior bad act 
does not qualify as the type of 'scrupulous[] examination required of] trial judges in the 
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proper exercise of [their] discretion.5" IcL (quoting Decorso. 1999 UT 57, ^ 18, 993 P.2d 
837). 
Just like the trial judge in Webster, the trial judge below admitted the robbery 
conviction without knowing the facts surrounding that offense. This omission was a plain 
abuse of discretion and requires reversal. IcL 
B. The State Failed to Establish a Non-Character 
Purpose for Admitting the Prior Act 
Even had the trial judge adequately examined the robbery conviction, the State 
failed to show that the prior act was admissible. Under Rule of Evidence 404(b), the 
State must (1) present the evidence for a non-character purpose; (2) show that the 
evidence is relevant to a material disputed fact; and (3) satisfy Rule of Evidence 403. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57,1120, 993 P.2d 837; Webster, 2001 UT App 238, If34 n.ll (State 
has burden of showing evidence offered for non-character purpose). The State 
established none of these requirements. 
The robbery conviction only served to show "general character . . . or propensity to 
commit bad acts." State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, % 15, 992 P.2d 951. The State claimed 
that it sought to admit the prior conviction for the purpose of showing that Mr. Kirkwood 
intended to possess the knife found on the table as a weapon. But, the State failed to 
explain how the use of a knife in a robbery shows an intent to possess a knife as a weapon 
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while on probation. The State did not allege, nor could it show, for example, that the two 
crimes established a common plan or scheme. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ^37. In fact, 
the State did not even establish when the crime occurred. IdL Rather, the State "failed to 
provide the trial court with sufficient details about the prior incident" to determine the 
purpose for admitting the prior use of a knife. Id. The State merely argued that because 
Mr. Kirkwood possessed a knife as a weapon on one occasion he must have possessed a 
different knife as a weapon on another. This propensity evidence is precisely the kind 
that Rule 404(b) bars. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, f 15, 992 P.2d 951. 
C. The Completely Unrelated Use of a Knife Had 
No Relevance to Determining Mr. Kirkwood's 
Intent in this Matter 
The prior use of a knife was not relevant to determining Mr. Kirkwood's intent in 
this case. Prior crimes evidence is only admissible if ,,cit tends to prove some fact 
material to the crime charged.5" State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah 1982) (emphasis in original). 
For evidence to be relevant, it must have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. In asserting relevance, the 
State failed to explain how the past possession of a weapon during a robbery rendered Mr. 
Kirkwood's intent to possess the knife as a weapon while on probation more probable. 
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Even the trial judge admitted that the issue was "close," the evidence only "somewhat" 
increased the probability of guilt in this case, and that the prior use of a knife was "not 
overwhelmingly relevant" to determining whether Mr. Kirkwood intended to possess a 
weapon in this case. R. 188: 52, 71. At most, the evidence had marginal relevance. 
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that some connection must exist 
between crimes before a trial court may admit a prior offense to show intent. Offenses 
must be related either because they are similar in nature, involved the same or related 
victims, included a common plan or scheme, or were closely related in time. State v. 
Widdison. 2001 UT 60,1J43, 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (abuse of defendant's other two 
children related to abuse of third child); State v. Reed. 2000 UT 68, TJ28 & n.3, 8 P.3d 
1025 ("unrelated" sex crimes not admissible to show intent); State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 
2000 UT 59, ffi[25, 27, 6 P.3d 1120 (evidence that defendant committed prior offenses in 
a signature-like manner within a few weeks of each other showed lack of consent); State 
v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 6-7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (evidence of remote, unrelated crimes not 
admissible); Featherson, 781 P.2d at 426-30 (evidence of dissimilar, remote crimes not 
admissible to prove intent). 
Few similarities exist between the crimes of robbery and possession of a weapon. 
A person commits robbery by employing threats or force to obtain property from the 
person of another regardless of whether a weapon is used. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 
(1999). In contrast, possession of a weapon by a restricted person forbids a probationer's 
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simple control of a weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a) (1999). Thus, contrary 
to robbery, weapons possession does not involve a victim and it requires the presence of a 
weapon. Rather than noting these differences, the State merely conjectured that because 
Mr. Kirkwood used a knife to commit a prior crime he intended to possess the knife as a 
weapon while on probation. The dissimilarities between the crimes defy the State's 
assertion. 
There is also no connection between the limited facts known about the robbery 
conviction and the incident below, other than both incidents involved a knife. In the 
robbery, Mr. Kirkwood apparently possessed a knife to facilitate another crime. In this 
case, Mr. Kirkwood was otherwise acting lawfully and he fully complied with law 
enforcement officers to submit to a search. Moreover, the knife was sitting on a table in 
his bedroom rather than on his person. Thus, unlike the robbery, the knife was not used 
in a crime of violence against another person, or any other crime at all. The instances are 
completely dissimilar. 
Even more to the point, the State failed to establish whether the robbery conviction 
was sufficiently close in time to this matter to be relevant. To admit a prior crime, the act 
must have '"clearly probative value with respect to the intent of the accused at the time of 
the offense charged."1 Featherson, 781 P.2d at 430 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis 
in original). The State provided no information about when the robbery occurred. 
Admittedly, Mr. Kirkwood was serving probation for that offense at the time of his arrest. 
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But, probation lasts as long as three years. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (1999). 
Further, the crime may have occurred much more distant than that because a significant 
amount of time could have elapsed from the commission of the crime and the imposition 
of sentence. Without knowing when the robbery occurred, the trial judge had no way of 
determining whether the "prior bad act was probative of the fact that [Mr. Kirkwood] had 
the intent" to possess a weapon in this case. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, p 7 . 
The trial judge also concluded that Mr. Kirkwood had "open[ed] the door" to 
admitting the prior use of a knife. R. 188: 72. Specifically, although the trial judge 
initially ruled that the prior act was not admissible, he later sua sponte concluded that if 
Mr. Kirkwood testified, the prior act evidence would become relevant. Thus, the trial 
judge concluded that somehow Mr. Kirkwood's act of testifying would render the 
admission of the past use of a knife more relevant than if he did not take the stand. 
There was nothing about Mr. Kirkwood's proposed testimony that rendered the 
prior use of the knife more relevant. The parties stipulated that Mr. Kirkwood was on 
probation for robbery and defense counsel alerted the jury that Mr. Kirkwood claimed 
that he used the knife for eating and to cut tape. Further, Officer Hansen testified that Mr. 
Kirkwood claimed to have used the knife for eating. The trial judge knew of no other 
facts that Mr. Kirkwood would have added that would have made the prior act more 
relevant then if Mr. Kirkwood had not testified. 
The trial judge failed to explain how Mr. Kirkwood's proposed testimony or his 
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mere act of testifying made the prior act more pertinent. As explained above, evidence is 
only relevant if it tends "to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. Mr. Kirkwood's proposed testimony that he used the 
knife as a tool did nothing to increase the probative value that his prior use of a knife 
established his intent at the time of his arrest. If the prior act was not sufficiently relevant 
without Mr. Kirkwood testifying, it was no more relevant than if he had testified. 
The Utah Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in State v. Colwell 2000 
UT 8, 994 P.2d 177. In that case, a murder defendant denied intending to shoot a police 
officer and argued, instead, that he sought to entice the officer to shoot him to facilitate 
the defendant's suicide. Id at ^[23. The State argued that Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant about the facts surrounding his 
prior convictions for riot and theft because he "brought his intent into issue." Id at p 0 . 
The Supreme Court rejected the State's claim and ruled that "the defendant's prior 
convictions [were not] relevant to his state of mind at the time of the" crime. Id. at ^[31. 
The State has similarly failed to show how Mr. Kirkwood's prior act was relevant. 
The trial judge below appears to have confused the admission of prior bad acts 
under Rule 404(b) with impeachment evidence. By conditioning the admission of the 
prior act on Mr. Kirkwood's testimony, the trial judge appears to have concluded that the 
evidence would become relevant as impeachment material. But, Rule of Evidence 609 
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only allows parties to impeach witnesses with the mere fact of a felony conviction or 
other crimes involving dishonesty. Utah R. Evid. 609(a). The circumstances surrounding 
such convictions are not admissible under that rule unless "the defendant explores the 
details of his prior convictions on direct examination or attempts to explain away the 
crime." ColwelL 2000 UT 8, | 31 , 994 P.2d 177. Because Mr. Kirkwood did not testify 
or try to "explain away" his prior crime, the evidence was not admissible as impeachment 
evidence. IdL 
The State also argued that Mr. Kirkwood opened the door to admitting the prior act 
evidence because he claimed to have used the knife as tool. Again, the Utah Supreme 
Court has rejected the State's claims. In State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, ffi[3, 21, 992 
P.2d 951, the State admitted several prior acts that the defendant had touched his nine-
year old daughter on her pelvic region. The defendant responded by testifying that he had 
only touched his daughter's genital area to apply ointment for a rash. Id. at ^|22. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the defendant did not open the door to the prior act testimony 
because he testified in response to the State's claims. Id The Supreme Court concluded 
that the defendant "was entitled, indeed required as a practical matter, to rebut or explain" 
the admission of evidence that the defendant had improperly touched his daughter prior to 
the crimes charged. Id. 
This case presents an equally strong basis for excluding Mr. Kirkwood's prior use 
of a knife. In the first place, the State initially distinguished between using a knife as a 
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tool and as a weapon when it declined to prosecute Mr. Kirkwood for the multi-purpose 
tool and pocket knife found in his bedroom. The prosecutor again raised this distinction 
during Officer Hansen's testimony at trial when he elicited that the probation officers also 
found the multi-purpose tool which they considered to be a tool rather than a weapon. R. 
188: 38-39. Mr. Kirkwood was certainly "entitled, indeed required as a practical matter, 
to rebut or explain" why the State distinguished between the various knives and tools 
found in Mr. Kirkwood's room. This distinction presented an obvious defense that Mr. 
Kirkwood was justified in raising without opening the door to prior act evidence. Due 
process and simple fairness demands allowing Mr. Kirkwood to require the State to 
satisfy its burden of proof when the State made this distinction. 
D, Without Knowing the Facte of the Robbery 
Conviction, the Trial Judge Could Not Have 
Made an Informed Decision about the 
Prejudicial Impact and Probative Value of the 
Prior Conviction 
The trial judge further abused his discretion in ruling that the prejudice resulting 
from admitting the use of a knife did not substantially outweigh the probative value of 
that evidence. Utah R. Evid. 403. In weighing probative value and potential for 
prejudice, courts must consider several factors: 
"[A] variety of matters must be considered, including the 
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, 
the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has 
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elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the 
efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility." 
State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on 
Evidence § 190 at 565 (3d Ed. 1984)). 
In admitting the evidence, the trial judge failed to even consider the strength of the 
evidence of the prior use of a knife, the similarities between the crimes, or the interval of 
time between the offenses. Id. He only knew that Mr. Kirkwood was on probation for 
committing a robbery with a knife. Without knowing the facts of the prior act, the trial 
judge could not have made an informed decision on the probative value and prejudicial 
effect of the evidence. 
The trial judge further failed to consider the need for the evidence and the efficacy 
of alternative proof. Admittedly, the State lacked direct evidence of Mr. Kirkwood's 
intent. But, even the trial judge admitted that the prior use of a knife only "somewhat" 
increased the probability of guilt and that this evidence was "not overwhelmingly 
relevant" to determining whether Mr. Kirkwood intended to possess a weapon in this 
case. R. 188: 71. Given the marginal probative value of the evidence, admitting the prior 
act did nothing to meet the State's needs for evidence of intent. 
The trial judge also neglected to consider the devastating impact that admitting the 
prior use of a knife had on the defense case. In particular, the trial judge completely 
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overlooked the need for Mr. Kirkwood's testimony: 
In weighing the prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial, 
an important consideration may be the effect on the validity of 
the fact-finding process if the defendant does not testify out of 
fear of the impact of the impeachment testimony for reasons 
other than its direct effect on his credibility ~ as where the 
defendant would be the only available source of material 
testimony in support of his defense. 
Sandoval 314 N.E.2d at 418. 
Although Officer Hansen testified that Mr. Kirkwood claimed he used the knife 
found on the table to eat his dinner, only Mr. Kirkwood knew the circumstances 
surrounding his use of the knife. The State discredited Mr. Kirkwood's claim of 
innocence by emphasizing that the knife was not a typical kitchen knife and that there 
was no evidence of crumbs or food particles on the knife or the table. Given the doubt 
the State cast on Mr. Kirkwood's explanation, it was essential for him to explain his 
actions. But, the trial judge's decision to admit the prior act evidence forced Mr. 
Kirkwood to alter his defense strategy as announced to the jury during opening statements 
that he would testify and explain his actions. Because only Mr. Kirkwood could rebut the 
State's claims, the trial judge's decision to admit the prior act evidence seriously 
prejudiced the defense. People v. Davis. 376 N.E.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. 1978) (admission of 
prior crimes prejudiced defendants when the decision to admit the evidence effectively 
prevented them from testifying and only their testimony could support defense of police 
frame-up). 
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Even assuming that the trial judge knew sufficient facts upon which to decide to 
admit the evidence, that limited information created a great risk of prejudice because it 
injected violence into the case. As one prominent court astutely observed, some crimes 
such as drug offenses "may be highly prejudicial, in view of the risk, despite the most 
clear and forceful limiting instructions." Sandoval 314 N.E.2d at 418. Given society's 
fears of crimes of violence, gangs, and the pervasive use of weapons, the introduction of a 
weapon into the trial would have a similar effect as drug usage. Evidence of violence has 
"a powerful tendency to mislead the trier of fact" into convicting persons based merely on 
their "propensity" to violence. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, [^15, 992 P.2d 951. Contrary to the 
trial judge's conclusion that the use of a knife would merely create "a slight increase in 
prejudice," R. 188: 72, that evidence created a significant risk of "rous[ing] the jury to 
overmastering hostility." Strickles, 760 P.2d at 296. 
E. The Decision to Admit the Use of the Knife 
Harmed Mr. Kirkwood By Preventing Him 
From Establishing His Defense 
The erroneous decision to admit the prior act directly affected the jury's verdict 
because it prevented the jury from hearing Mr. Kirkwood's full defense. "[T]o constitute 
reversible error, the error complained of must be sufficiently prejudicial that there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its absence." 
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 431. The mid-trial decision to allow the prosecutor to admit the 
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use of a knife if Mr. Kirkwood testified placed Mr. Kirkwood in a no-win dilemma. At 
the outset of the trial, defense counsel informed the jury that Mr. Kirkwood planned to 
testify that he used the knife to eat dinner and as a tool to cut tape. R. 188:25. But, when 
the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to admit the prior use of a knife, Mr. Kirkwood was 
forced to choose between allowing the jury to hear evidence of his "propensity" to 
violence or to present no evidence and to argue reasonable doubt to the jury. The latter 
option included the risk that the jury would wonder why he changed his mind about 
testifying and the resultant hazard that the jurors would speculate about his intent in 
possessing the knife. 
Had the jury heard from Mr. Kirkwood, it likely would have decided the verdict 
differently. The jury had expressed some doubts about the State's case when it acquitted 
Mr. Kirkwood of possessing the knife found in the gym bag on the floor. But, the jury 
lacked sufficient information to accept Mr. Kirkwood's story, as reported through Officer 
Hansen, that he used the other knife found on the table to eat. Specifically, the jury heard 
no evidence about Mr. Kirkwood using the knife as a tool to cut tape and it had no basis 
for rebutting the State's arguments that no food particles existed on the table or the knife. 
Mr. Kirkwood's testimony would have been consistent with the evidence. His 
bedroom was cluttered and was used for several purposes including a laundry room and a 
place where tools were stored. His eating in the room was plausible given the multi-
purpose use of the room and the room's messy state. Further, the presence of tools and 
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clutter in the room indicated that Mr. Kirkwood also used the room as a workshop 
because the small two-bedroom home lacked space. This use of the room was consistent 
with his claim that he used the knife to cut tape. Had the jury heard this evidence, it 
would have had a reasonable basis for accepting not only Mr. Kirkwood's explanation 
about the gym bag but also his claims about the knife found on the table. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Kirkwood requests this Court to reverse his conviction and to order a new trial 
based on the trial judge's abuse of discretion in admitting the prior act evidence. 
Dated this 5 ^ day of August, 2001. 
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